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Redesigning the International Lender of Last Resort
Patrick Bolton and David A. Skeel, ]r.*

ABSTRACT
This paper is concerned with the issue of how to balance bailouts (or
"lending into arrears") with debt reductions (or "private sector
involvement") in the resolution of sovereign debt crises. It provides a
review of recent proposals for improving the sovereign debt restructuring
process. In addition to defending a sovereign bankruptcy proposal we have
put forward in recent work, this article proposes a major reorientation of
the IMF's role in sovereign debt crises.
I. INTROD U CTION
Since the Mexican Debt Crisis of

1994-95, which gave rise to an

International Monetary Fund ("IMF") bailout of unprecedented size, there has
been a raging debate on how the IMF should handle sovereign debt crises.
Despite the successful resolution of the crisis and Mexico's quick repayment of
all its emergency debt, the sheer size of the intervention has raised worries that
bailouts

could cause

significant

sovereign

debt

market

distortions.

These

. concerns, in turn, have led to a reconsideration of the prevailing wisdom that the
IMF can and should act as the de facto international lender of last resort
("ILOLR") by arranging bailouts in response to major sovereign debt crises. As
is now widely recognized, the problem with a purely bailout-based policy is that
it requires ever larger funds to be credible and successful. It also invites
undesirable policies by debtor countries. The prospect of a bailout encourages
suvereign debtors to borrow more than they should, and it tempts them to
resort to highly risky fixed exchange rate policies as a quick fix towards

John H. Scully '66 Professor of Finance and Economics, Princeton University; S. Samuel Arsht
Professor of Corporate Law, ·Universit),of Pennsylvania. We are grateful to Bill Bratton, Lee
Buchheit, Douglas Diamond, Mitu Gulati, Jim Feinerman, Dan Tarullo, Kathy Zeiler and to
participants at a workshop at Georgetown University Law Center and at the IPD-UN Sovereign
Debt Initiative meetings at Columbia University for helpful comments on earlier drafts·
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macroeconomic discipline. 1 Of course, the worst debtor misconduct can be
controlled to some extent by imposing conditions on the debtor country before
granting a rescue program, but more often than not, the IMF finds itself in a
weak bargaining position at the onset of a debt crisis. How credible is the IMF
threat to withhold a financial aid package when a potentially contagious debt
crisis is about to erupt? And once the bailout has been granted, why should the
debtor country abide by the conditions it agreed to?
Because of the potentially enormous financial commitment

a

pure ILOLR

policy requires, and because of the moral hazard it may induce in sovereign debt
markets, it is now widely understood that bailouts need to be supplemented by
at least a partial "bailin" of the private sector. According to this view, the IMP's
involvement in a debt crisis should be conditioned on debt reduction or
rescheduling by private sector lenders. Private creditors should be required" that
is, to share at least some of the costs of resolving a crisis. Despite this emerging
consensus on the importance of private sector involvement, however, there is
still considerable disagreement on the appropriate balancing between bailout and
bailin, and on the best process for crisis resolution and debt restructuring.
The most ambitious overhaul of IMF policy contemplated so far involves
the introduction of some form of bankruptcy institution for sovereigns and
envisions a single forum where the extent of debt reduction and the size of new
emergency lending would be decided simultaneously. There was considerable
discussion and research of this strategy-which the IMF calls a Sovereign Debt
Restructuring Mechanism ("SDRlvI")-from late 2001, when the IMF first
announced its support for a sovereign bankruptcy framework, up to the G-10
meetings in April 2003, when the IMP's proposal was shelved. Despite all the
writing and debates, many open questions were still unresolved at the time of the
G-10 meetings, including the role of the IMF in an SDRM regime. No doubt
these questions would have received further attention if the SDRlvI proposal had
gone forward. But in the aftermath of the SDlUvI debate, no clear new role has
been marked out for the IMF and no clear rules have emerged to direct the
IMP's balancing of bailins and bailouts in future debt crises.
As a result, the IMF now finds itself at a crossroads. Should it be content
with the status quo and accept that it will be less and less equipped to deal with
major emerging market debt crises? Or, on the contrary, should its size be

The IMF bears its own share of responsibility in recommending such policies. For critical
assessments of IMF policy recommendations on macroeconomic stabilization and intervention
during the Asia crisis of 1997-98, see Paul Blustein, The Chastening: Inside the Disis that Rocked the
Global Fillamial Systelll and Hllmbled the IAiF (publicAffairs 2001) and ] oseph E. Stiglitz,
Globalizatioll alld Its Discontents, 89-132 (Norton 2002). For a more sympathetic view, see Nouriel
Roubini and Brad Setser, Bailollts or Bail-illS?: Re.rpolldillg to Fillal/cial Clises ill EtllCIgilig Ecollomies (Inst
Inti Econ 2004).
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considerably expanded, possibly by granting a more powerful role to Japan,
China and other East Asian countries that are sitting on massive idle foreign
exchange reserves? Or, even more radically, should the Il'vlF disclaim any role in
crisis lending and confine itself to an advisory and forecasting function, as Chari
2
and Kehoe, Rogoff, and others have urged?
In this paper, we argue that by establishing an adequate bankruptcy
procedure for sovereigns, the international community could both fully address
the problem of sovereign debt restructuring and redefine an ambitious crisis
resolution role for the IMP. Far from stepping away from a crisis lending role,
we argue that the IMF could, without increasing the size of its funding, enhance
its ILOLR role within the framework of a sovereign bankruptcy procedure. How
do we square this circle?
Corporate bankruptcy provides a useful analogy for describing the new role
we envision for the IMP. When a nonfinancial corporation ends up in financial
distress, it does not, as a rule, seek a bailout from the government. Instead it ftles
for bankruptcy, thus receiving temporary relief from its creditors. This relief
from creditors-or "stay"-is the characteristic of corporate bankruptcy that
has been emphasized most in the sovereign context. But, in addition to a stay on
debt collection, and more significant for our purposes, the distressed firm can
also ask the court to approve new priority lending-usually in connection with
so-called "first day orders" that authorize the company to continue paying its
3
employees and thus preserve its going concern value. When the bankruptcy
court grants new priority lending, it is not extending its own funds, as the IMF
2

In his pO"l.verful analysis of the history of \X/orld Bank and IMF lending over the past sixty years,
Rogoff argues:
[M]y long-held view is that the Fund would serve better if it made no loans. In
a nutshell, the Fund's current resources of $150 billion seem like enough to
cause moral-hazard problems (that is, to induce excessive borrowing) without
being enough to deal with a really deep global financial crisis. The Fund is just
too politicised to be a consistently effective lender of last resort, and if its
financial structure is not changed, there are always going to be Argentinas.
No, the right future for the Fund, as for the IBRD, is to phase itself out of the
lending business. The Fund can still make itself very useful in co-ordinating
the global financial system, in offering technical advice, and perhaps even in
is.5uing debt ratings to countries that request it. If the global community can
work its way towards an improved bankruptcy procedure for sovereign
borrowers, this path will be far easier. I would recommend it regardless.
Kenneth Rogoff, The Sisters at 60, Economist 63, 65 Ouly

24, 2004). See also V.v. Chari and

Patrick J. Kehoe, Asking the Right Questions about the IMF, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis
Annual Report Issue (1998) (arguing that there is no need for the IMF to serve as ILOLR given
that the central banks of the
First day orders

are

G-7 can already intervene directly in the event of a crisis).

described in Marvin Krasny and Kevin J. Carey, Editors Rep!;' to an Anol1)!Jl/ous

Leffelj' WI:')I is Delmllare the Venue

of Choice for

Philadelphia-Based Companies?, Legal Intelligencer 9

22, 1996); Marcus Cole, 'Ve/al/.'are is Not a State": Are We /Pitnessingjunsdictiona/ Competition
in BallkmptC)I?, 55 Vand L Rev 1845, 1856 n 58, 1864-65 (2002).
(March

Summer 2005

179

Chicago JOt/rna! of International LaJIJ

does when it puts together a financing package for a distressed sovereign. All the
court does is make way for new lending by the private sector-often the same
lenders that have already lent to the distressed firm in the past-by granting the
new loans higher priority status.
We suggest that, just as a bankruptcy court does for corporations, the IMF
could play the role of granting first-day orders to distressed sovereigns in the
context of a sovereign bankruptcy procedure. Importantly, the IMF would not
need any new funding to exercise this authority. Thus, a major additional benefit
of sovereign bankruptcy is that it could open the way for a new enhanced role
for the IMP. This new role would indeed strengthen the IMF's hand, as it would
enable the IMF to facilitate much larger emergency lending packages consisting
not just of IMF funding but private lending as well. In addition, it would not
give rise to the same concerns about moral hazard as does the current form of
intervention that relies on publicly funded IMF bailouts. In particular, since the
fund would no longer just be extending its own funds, it would be subject to
greater market discipline. The private lenders that the IMF would invite to
provide the new capital could be expected to do so only if there were a plausible
financial rationale for extending the loans. Moreover, the IMF could not extend
priority status too liberally without imperiling its very existence.
To achieve this restructuring of the IMF's role, the underlying sovereign
bankruptcy framework would need to provide coherent and enforceable priority
rules.4 In earlier work that did not envision this new role for the IMF, we argued
that solidifying creditors' seniority rights may be the single most important
benefit of establishing a sovereign bankruptcy regime.s In this Article, we take
the analysis a step further, to incorporate a reconceptualized role for the IMF-a
role that would avoid the increasingly real risk that the IMF might otherwise
become obsolete.
The remainder of our article proceeds as follows. In Part II, we discuss the
recent policy proposals for improving the sovereign debt restructuring process.
We also consider the extent to which the benefits of a statutory procedure could
be achieved through contractual alternatives, and briefly explore the implications
At a minimum this new role for the IMF is possible only if higher priority status can be granted to
emergency lending. So far, the IMF has been able to implicitly enforce higher priority on its own
and other International Financial Institution ("IFI") loans. However, this de facto priority is partly
an illusion as the IMF has generally agreed to roll over its loans when the sovereign was unable or
unwilling to pay. This higher priority status has also recently been tested by Argentina following
its default on sovereign bonds. Conceivably, the IMF could already play the new role ,"ve
propose-granting higher priority to emergency loans from the private sector-under the current
legal environment. However, de facto, implicit enforcement of priority is likely to be more
difficult to scale up and may need to be shored up by legal enforcement through the courts.
Patrick Bolton and David A. Skeel, Jr., Inside the Black Box: HOJIJ Should a SO�'ereign Bankruptcy

FrameJlJork Be .l/mettlred?, 53 Emory LJ 763, 766-67
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of the recent debt crisis in Argentina. Part III maps out the new role for the IMF
and assesses how IMF actions in debt crises may need to be circumscribed.
I I. INTERVENTION 'IN DEBT CRISES AND POLICY DEBATES

A wide range of reforms have been proposed as a partial or complete
solution to the concerns described in the introduction. Such propositions have
included greater use of collective action clauses ("CACs") in bonds, a structured
mediation or arbitration process for addressing sovereign debt crises, and
various forms of sovereign bankruptcy. This section first briefly discusses CACs
and some problems with their use, and then focuses at greater length on the
IMP's sovereign bankruptcy proposal, and on our own proposed framework-a
more expansive alternative to the IMF proposa1.6
Sovereign bonds governed by UK law have long included CACs specifying
voting rules that permit a predetermined majority of bondholders to adjust
payment or interest terms in the event of a debt crisis. In contrast, bonds
governed by N ew York law have traditionally given each bondholder veto power
to decide whether or not to agree to a restructuring. In the 1990s, an increasing
number of commentators concluded that the New York "unarumit)," approach
made restructuring too difficult. To facilitate coordination among the
sovereign'S bondholders, and to counteract the threat of holdouts, they argued,
sovereign debtors should include CACs in all of their bonds.7
At its April 2003 meetings, the G-10, led by the US Treasury Department,
endorsed a policy that strictly limits private sector involvement to only a
voluntary inclusion of CACs in sovereign bond issues. Partly to stave off more
drastic intervention in sovereign debt contracts and partly to placate the US
Treasury, issuers have since introduced CACs into their new sovereign bond
issues. In mid-2003, Mexico very publicly issued New York-registered bonds
that permitted changes to the payment terms of bond with the consent of 75
percent of the holders, and several other sovereigns, including Uruguay and
Brazil, followed suit.8
6

Id.

7

For an early, influential emphasis on CACs, see Barry Eichengreen and Richard Portes, Cliszs?
Wbat Crisis? OrderlY IWorkouts for Sovereign Debtors 49 (Centre for Econ Poly Rsrch 1995). More
recentiy,NIiru{;uiati has written extensively about the use and promise of CACs. See, for
example, Lee e. Buchheit and G. Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Bonds and tbe Collective Will, 51 Emory L J
1317 (2002). For a nuanced view of the choice between CACs and the unanimity approach, see
William W. Bratton and G. Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Debt RejOI7Jl and tbe Best Interest oj Creditors, 57
Vand L Rev 1 (2004).
Since the end of 2003, nearly every new issuance of sovereign bonds has featured a CAe.
Interestingly, the latest Uruguayan bond issues also include an aggregation clause that permits a
combined vote of all the classes of bonds that include the clause. The clause is designed to
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Despite these encouraging developments, however, there are still several
reasons to suspect that CAC enthusiasts have oversold the virtues of the new
clauses. First, CACs are more effective for restructuring one or a small number
of classes of bonds, than for sovereign debtors with a more complicated capital
structure.9 Second, although CACs help �ounteract collective action and holdout
problems, they do nothing to remedy any seniority and debt dilution problems
as we explain below. CACs also do not address concerns such as the need for a
standstill while the sovereign debtor is renegotiatingjts obligations.lO Because of
these shortcomings, we believe that a more interventionist policy, such as the
statutory approach advocated by the IMF, is called for.
A. THE IMF's SOVEREIG N DEBT
RESTRUCT U RING MECHANISM

The IMF's sovereign bankruptcy initiative was first announced in a
November 2001 speech by Anne Krueger. The IMF staff subsequently produced
a series of detailed draft proposals outlining an SDRi\1 in 2002 and early 2003.
Because the IMF's proposal has been the lightning rod for recent debate over
sovereign bankruptcy, we will explore it in some detail before considering our
.
own proposed a1ternatlve. 11
The guiding concern of the IMF's proposal is to resolve collective action
problems among dispersed creditors in debt restructuring negotiations, while
preserving creditor contractual rights to the greatest extent possible. Viewed
from this perspective, the key element in the IMF's proposed mechanism is a
majority vote among creditors on a restructuring plan that would bind a
dissenting minority. With the aim of preserving creditor rights, the IMF's plan
obviate the need for separate votes for each class of bonds by creating the possibility of a single,
interclass vote on the terms of a restructuring. These developments are recounted and analyzed in
Stephen J. Choi and G. lVlitu Gulati, Innol'atioll ill Boilerplate Contracts: All EllIpiJical E"'a!JlliJatioJl of
Sot'ereigll Bonds, 53 Emory L J 929 (2004) and Stephen Choi and G. Miru Gulati, Tbe Evoilitioll of
BoileJplate COli tracts: Evidence from tbe Sovereign Debt lvIarket (2004) (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with the authors).
This point is discussed in more detail in David
All', 52 Emory L J 417 (2003).
10

11

A.

Skeel, J r., Can Majority Voting Provisions Do it

Bolton and Skeel, 53 Emory L J at 773-76 (discussing (his and additional shortcomings) (cited in
note 5).
Much of the description and analysis in this section is drawn from Bolton and Skeel, 53 Emory L
J at 776-80 (cited in note 5). The IMP's first detailed proposal was Ii\lF, Tbe Design of the Sovereign
Debt Restmcttlling j\1.echanisJJJ -Fllrtber Considerations (Nov 27, 2002), available online at
<http://www.imf.org/external!np/pdr/sdrm/2002/1 12702.pdf>(visitedIvlarI5.2005). This
proposal was subsequently adjusted. IMF, Proposed Features of a Sovereign Debt RestJ'tlctllJiJ�g iVfecbanislll
(Feb 12, 2003), available online at <http://,..vw.w imf.org/e'Xternaljnp/pcl·r/sdrm/2003/
021203.pdf>(visited Mar 20, 2005).

182

Vo!. 6 No.1

Redesigning the International Lender of Last Res011

Bo/ton & Skeel

stops short of envisaging a stay on litigation and individual debt collection
efforts or a standstill on debt payments . The relative difficulty of colle cting
sovereign assets, as opposed to corporate assets, is the main justification given
for not introducing an automatic stay into an SDRM.
The main limitation on plaintiffs ' gains envisioned by the IMP mirrors a
legal rule in international insolvency law known as the "Hotchpot rule." This
rule requires that any payment or asset collected by a plaintiff through litigation
must be offset against the plaintiff's claim under the restructuring agreement.
That i s , any new claim the plaintiff would be entitled to under the res tructuring
agreement would be reduced by an amount equal to what the creditor obtained
through

legal

action.

Should

the

plaintiff

obtain

more

than

what

the

restructuring agreement specifie s , the "Hotchpot rule" could be supplemented
with a claw-back provision-but the IMP's propo sed plan excludes such a
provision on the grounds that it would be impractical.
The "Hotchpot rule" clearly reduces incentives for private litigation, but it
does not eliminate them. Also, it does not directly address the concern that
private litigation may be undertaken mainly as a negotiation or delaying tactic
for example by undermining the sovereign's ability to trade. The IMP's proposed
plan recognizes this is sue and proposes that a judge could have authority to stay
specific legal actions on request of the debtor and subject to approval of
creditors.
The voting provision and the "H otchpot rule" are the centerpieces of the
IMP's proposed plan. The plan also contains many more technical provisions
dealing with notification of creditors, registration, and verification of claims. As
in corporate bankruptcy these

can be lengthy and difficult processes. An

important additional complication is that the ultimate ownership of a sovereign
bond is hard to trace. The court must be able to pierce through the veil o f
beneficial ownership t o be able to ascertain whether the votes on a particular
bond are controlled by the sovereign. Should that be the case, these votes ought
to be ineligible for obvious conflict of interest reasons.12 A related difficulty is
that for widely dispersed debt structures many claims may not be registered in
time. Given the large number of claims that will not qualify, a requirement that a
supermaj ority of "'registered" claims approve the plan may function more like a
simple majority requirement in practice-thus resulting in weaker protection of
12

The problem of sovereign control of key claims, and through these claims, of a vote by creditors,
figured prominently in a sovereign debt dispute involving Brazil in the 1990s. Through Banco do
Brasil, which had participated in a syndicated loan agreement, Brazil managed to thwart an effort
by other debtholders to accelerate the amounts due under the loan. CIBC Bank and Trust Campa/I)I
v Banco Central do Brasil, 886 F Supp 1 105, 1118 (SDNY 1 995) (refusing to intervene to impose
implied obligations of good faith and fair dealing). For discussion and criticism, see Bratton and
Gulati, 57 Vand L Rev at 75-77 (cited in note 7).
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creditors.

These

difficulties

underscore

the

need

for

a

court-supervised

res tructuring procedure as well as the important benefits that might be available
if an international clearinghouse were established.
Be cause the principal concern of the IMF's proposed plan is res olving o f
collective action problems among sovereign bondholders, the mechanism is
underinclusive and incomplete as to the two other maj or facets of a res tructuring
procedure: the provision of interim financing and enforcement of absolute
priority. The plan'S only means of enforcing absolute priority is through the
exclusion of several classes of deb t from the SDRM. Thus, the plan proposes to
exclude privileged claims, obligations to international organizations such as the
IMF ("multilaterals"), and debt owed to other nations (the "Paris Club"). The
IMF prop osal also gives the sovereign debtor discretion to exclude other debt
claims-s uch as trade credit, claims on the central bank, etc.-from the SDR1VI:.
An obvious difficulty with this approach is that it gives the debtor considerable
power to undermine a given priority structure and to cut side deals with
particular creditor clas ses in exchange for an exclusion of the claims from the
formal SDRM proceedings .
The plan recognizes some of these difficulties and offers, as an alternative,
to include Paris Club debt in the SDR1\1 under a separate clas s . The plan also
allows for other forms o f classi fication and gives the debtor discretion to classify
subject

to

the

general

requirement

that

classification does

not

result

in

unjusti fied discrimination among creditor groups. 13 While classification brings
about greater flexibility it is important to understand that it does not in any way
guarantee

enforcement

of absolute priority.

To the

contrary,

as

currently

structured the IMF's plan may well facilitate deviations from absolute priority by
giving a veto power, unconstrained by a cramdown or best interest rule, to a
junior creditor clas s.
Just as

the IMF's plan does not systematically address the is sue

of

enforcing absolute priority it also only gives lip service to the is sue of debtor-in
posse ssion ("DIP") financing. With the objective once again of pres erving
creditor contractual rights as much as possible, the IMF's propos ed plan only
allows for "priority financing" if it is approved by "75 percent of outs tanding
principal of registered claims."
address

14

The main purpose of DIP financing is to

an immediate cash crisis and allow the debtor to function while

res tructuring negotiations

are

ongoing.

Clearly,

a

creditor

vote

would be

extremely difficult to organize in a timely fashion, making it virtually impos sible
to organize any such financing.
13

14

IMF, Tbe Design

of tbe SOIJereigll Debt Restructuring Alecbal1lsm-Fliltber ConsideratiollS

at

� 25 (cited in

note 11).
Id at � 23.
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The last key component of the IMF's plan is its proposal to set up an
independent Sovereign Debt Dispute Resolution Forum ("SDDRF") to oversee
1S
the sovereign bankruptcy process. The selection of SDDRF judges would be
delegated to a selection panel designated by the IMF's Managing Director and
charged with the task of creating a shortlist of candidate judges that might be
impaneled when a debt crisis arises. The final shortlist would be subject to
approval of the IMF's governing board. The president of the SDDRF would be
charged with selection of the final group of four judges to be impaneled in the
event of a crisis. While the plan goes to considerable lengths to guarantee the
independence of the SDDRF it is still worth noting that this procedure is not a
foolproof method

to

guarantee the full independence of the court.

Overall, the IMF plan is an extremely important development in our
thinking about how best to address sovereign debt crises. As this brief overview
makes clear, however, it also has serious limitations. Most importantly, the IMF
plan focuses extensively on the ex post issue of solving creditors' collective
action problems, but it pays much less attention to the equally important issue of
the ex ante effects of an SDRM-in particular, the need to honor creditors'
priorities in order to facilitate sovereign credit markets. In addition, the IMF's
interim financing proposal is cumbersome and does not fully address the
growing concerns about the nature of the IMF's funding and oversight role.
Finally, the creation of an SDDRF within the IMF itself raises independence and
conflict of interest concerns.

B. ENFORCING SENIORITY
Although the IMF plan focuses on collective action problems, an equally
important problem is debt dilution and the lack of enforcement of seniority in
sovereign debt. In the absence of enforceable priorities, when a debtor country
approaches financial distress any new debt it issues is partly at the expense of
existing creditors who face a greater risk of default and will have to accept a
greater "haircut" (or debt reduction) in the event of default, since the total
resources the debtor can muster towards repayment of its stock of debt will have
to be divided pro rata among all its creditors, old and new. In earlier work, we
have highlighted how the lack of enforcement of an absolute priority rule
encourages overborrowing by the sovereign as it approaches financial distress
16
and also raises its overall cost of borrowing.
15
16

Id at � 227-73.
Bolton and Skeel, 53 Emory L J at 771-72 (cited in note 5). For a more extensive analysis, see
Patrick Bolton and Olivier J eanne, Stmcttm·ng and Restnlctming Sovereigll Debt: The Role of SeniO/it)',
at
<http://gsb,vww.uchicago.edu/researcb/worksbops/finance/
online
available
Bolton_J eanne_October04.pdf> (visited Feb 9, 2005) (providing a formal analysis of optimal debt
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Under the old IMF bailout-based policy the enforcement of an absolute
priority rule was not a burning is sue, since typically private creditors could
expect repayment in full. But the shift in IMF policy towards private sector
involvement following the Rus sian debt crisis of

1998

has brought to light the

issue o f priority in repayment and introduced new uncertainty in sovereign debt
markets by upsetting market expectations concerning seniority. Two subs equent
events roiled the waters still further:

1999-2000;

and

(2)

(1)

the deb t restructuring of Pakistan in

the decision by the Court of Appeals of Brus sels in

2000

to

grant Elliott Associates, a vulture fund that had invested in Peruvian debt, a
res training order against Euroclear-preventing it from accepting trans fers from
the Peruvian government towards paying other creditors before Elliott's debt
17
claims on Peru had been honored.
The first event, Pakistan's debt restructuring agreement o f

2000,

required

for the first time that Eurobond holders be included in the restructuring
agreement, thus shattering the market's perception that these debts had higher
18
The second event, Elliott Associates v Peru, alerted the market to

priority status.

the potentially far-reaching possibilities that the traditional interpretation of the
19
standard pan' passu clause in sovereign bond issues might no longer be valid,
and that private litigants could threaten to disrupt the tran s fer of funds from
sovereigns to creditors by obtaining restraining orders in court.
The new uncertainty as to which types of sovereign debt will be subj ect to
res tructuring, and as to the meaning of the ubiquitous pczri passu clause, has
propelled the issue of priority and debt seniority to the forefront o f discussions
about sovereign finance. B e fore examining how debt seniority can best be
enforced, we begin by des cribing the Elliott decision and the legal debate
surrounding it in more detail.
Elliott Associates, playing an aggres s ive holdout strategy, refused to go
along with Peru's proposed Brady Plan debt res tructuring of

1995.

Instead, it

attempted to obtain repayment on its debt by initiating a series o f lawsuits and
eventually prevailed in the Court of Appeals of Brussels in S eptember

I"

IH

19

2000.

structure in the absence of any legal enforcement of seniority). The authors show that creditors
attempt to achieve higher priority de facto by making their debt difficult to restructure. Overall,
this results in an excessively high cost of financial distress. Id.
v Banco de la Nacion, 194 F3d 363, 366-67 (2d Cir 1999); Elliot l\SSOCS, LP,
General Docket No 2000/QR/92 (Court of Appeals of Brussels, 8th Chamber, Sept 26,2000).

E/liott ASJocs, LP

See Jeromin Zettelmeyer, The Casejor all Explicit SenifJ/ity 5tmctnre iN Sonreign Debt (Sept 29; 2003)
(unpublished working paper draft, IMF Research Department) (on ftle \vith authors) and Anna
Gelpern, Building a Better Seating Cbart jor SOl'fl"eigli Res/me/mings, 53 Emory L J 1115, 1128-30
(2004).
The competing interpretations of the pati paJS/" clause are described below. See note 23 and
accompanying text.
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Eager to avoid a default on its Brady bonds, the Peruvian Government decided
to settle follo"\ving the court's decision by paying Elliott in full.20
Underlying the Brussels court's decisjon was a seemingly straightforward
interpretation of the paripasstl clause. The clause states that "[t]he obligations of
the Guarantor hereunder [the Peruvian Government] do rank and will rank at
least pari passu in priority of payment with all other External Indebtedness of the
1
Guarantor, and interest thereon." 2 The court interpreted this language as
meaning that when the debtor is unable to repay all its debts in full, all claims of
equal ranking under the pa17"passu clause should get a pro rata share of the total
amount the debtor pays out. Most importantly, the court deemed that the debtor
could not make payments to some creditors (the creditors who agreed to the
restructuring) and default on others (the creditors who held out and retained
their original bonds). It was on the basis of this interpretation that the court
granted Elliott Associates a restraining order against Euroclear, the entity to
which Peru had wired funds to pay consenting bondholders the scaled down
amounts they had agreed to accept.22
The

court's

interpretation

provoked

a

torrent

of

criticism. 23 Most

commentators favor an alternative reading of the pari passu clause: that it is
designed to prevent the borrower from issuing new debt that is senior to existing
debt. Which interpretation the courts will adopt in the future is still uncertain,
although in light of the outpouring of academic writing and briefs following the
Brussels Opinion, the narrower interpretation favored by most legal scholars
seems likely to prevail.
Lost in the hand-wringing over the Brussels Court of Appeals' novel
interpretation of the boilerplate pa17"passu clause is the possibility that the court's
remedy could open up a new strategy for enforcement of sovereign debt
payments-with far-reaching consequences not conceived of before. Crucial to
this possibility is the fact that the court granted a restraining order against
EUROCLEAR, rather than limiting itself to a judgment against Peru.
To appreciate the implications, start with Gulati and I<lee's ominous
warning that:

20
21

22

23

G. Mitu Gulati and Kenneth N. Klee,Sovereign Pirary, 56 Bus Law 635, 635-36 (2001).
Id at 636. See also Elliott Assocs, LP v Ballco de la Nacion, 2000 US Dist LEXIS 14169 (SD NY Sept
29,2000) and Elliott Assocs, U) v Republic ojPeru, 2000 US Dist LEXIS 368 (SDNY Jan 18,2000).
In effect,Elliott claimed that it was entitled both to claim its share of the payments being made to
consenting bondholders, and (unlike the consenters) to continue to insist on payment of the full
face amount of its bonds. See Gulati and Klee, 56 Bus Law at 636-37 (cited in note 20).
For critiques of the Elliott ruling, see, for example, id at 635; William W. Bratton, Pan' PasSil and a
Distressed Sovereign's Rational Choices, 53 Emory L J 823 (2004); Lee C. Buchheit and Jeremiah S.
Pam, The Pal7 Pam! Clause ill Sovereign Debt Instrulllents, 53 Emory L J 869 (2004).
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\X'hat the Brussels Opinion does is to put a large hammer in the hands of
holdout creditors, thereby enabling them to cause even more disruption in
restructurings. Those inclined to be holdouts have a stronger position, and
it encourages others to hold out. For the sovereigns and, we argue, for the
majority of creditors, this is a nightmarish situation.24

The restraining order does indeed

amount

to

a"

big stick for creditors,

which plausibly should not be put in the hands of holdout creditors. Interesting
new p o s sibilities, however, can be imagined if one thinks of this stick as
potentially applying to the enforcement of debt payments and seniority more
generally. If creditors' inability to seize as sets and a sovereign'S limited capacity
to issue collateralized debt interfere with a sovereign'S ability to borrow,. then an
effective way of relaxing the sovereign's borrowing constraint may be to give
creditors the means to credibly threaten to shut out a defaulting sovereign from
international financial m arkets by preventing it from p aying off new creditors.
The greater enforcement powers made possible by Elliott-type injunctions
have inspired several commentators to outline the contours of a contractual
approach to the enforcement of seniority in sovereign debt. One suggestion, put
forward by both Zettelmeyer and Gelpern, is for senior creditors to enforce the
priority ostensibly granted to them by a sovereign debtor vis-a.-vis o ther junior
creditors pursuant to a "third-party beneficiary"

theory. Junior creditors would

agree to subordinate their claims, and courts might enforce the subordination,
based on the theory that the junior creditors could be construed as beneficiaries
25
of the financing from the senior creditor. Another suggestion, first offered by
Wood, is to contractually require the sovereign to include senior creditors as
26
parties in subsequent junior debt issues. I f sovereign debtors began to include
these kinds of subordination arrangements in their debt contracts, one could
conceive of Elliot-type injunctions that courts might grant to senior creditors
against a sovereign that later attempted to violate the terms of the earlier
agreement. I f a sovereign debtor that had agreed to subordinate any subsequent
debt failed to do so, a creditor could ask a court to enjoin the new issuance.
While such remedies might conceivably discipline sovereigns and open the
way for contractual enforcement o f an absolute priority rule for sovereign debt,
one concern is that the cure could be worse than the disease. There exists a real
potential for nightmarish disruptions to the payment sys tem, and one can als o
imagine a multiplication o f costly legal actions among creditors. In addition, this
strategy would impose a continuous monitoring burden on the senior creditors.
Because any sub ordination clause included in a creditor's contract with the
24
25

26

Gulati and Klee, 56 Bus Law at 638 (cited in note 20).
Zettelmeyer, The Case jor an Explicit Seniority Structure in Sovereign Debt (cited in note 18); Gelpern,
53 Emory L] at 1152-53 (cited in note 1 S}.
Philip R. Wood, The Law ojSubordinated Debt (Street & M�....'Well
.
1990).
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borrower could not bind a subsequent third-party borrower who might be
ignorant about the priority arrangement, the s enior creditor would be forced to
police .the debtor to make sure that the sovereign included a subordination
provision in each s ubsequent debt issuance.27
We do not mean to discourage these contractual innovations , which may
be the only realistic way fonvard in the absence of a renewed effort on the part
of major debtor and creditor nations to introduce a sovereign bankruptcy
procedure. But it is important to recognize that the contractual approach brings
important risks which could be largely avoided under an expanded statutory debt
restructuring mechanism, as we now explain.

C . O U R PRO POSAL
The
is sues:

(1)

SDRM

either ignores or does not satisfactorily addres s three critical

the absence of a coherent priority scheme;

(2)

the need for an interim

financing strategy that refines and alters the role of the IMF; and

(3)

the need for

an independent decisionmaker to oversee the sovereign bankruptcy framework.
In earlier work, we have explained how an expanded sovereign bankruptcy
framework might handle each of these issues.28
\X!ith respect to priority, the sovereign bankruptcy framework should
include a straight first-in-time priority s cheme, together with voting procedures
that call for absolute priority treatment-that is, the assurance that higher
priority creditors will be paid in full, and that any haircut will be aimed first at
lower priority creditors . Under our proposal, priority would be based on the
time that the credit was extended, with the debt of any given year taking priority
over debt is sued in a subsequent year. Based on thi s priority, the sovereign
debtor would divide its creditors into clas ses at the outset of a two tier voting
proces s for restructuring the sovereign 'S debt. For the purposes of the first vote,
the debtor would make a proposal as to how much of its overall debt would be
discharged-that is, how large the overall haircut to creditors would be-and
submit the proposal to a vote of all creditors . 29 If a majority of all creditors

If the prioril)' arrangement were somehow deemed to be binding on a subseguent creditor, the
higher "due diligence" burden would fall on new lenders, who would need to determine what the
stock of outstanding senior debts was before making a loan. Short of setting up a central register
28
29

of �enior debt tha.t .could .be easilv accessed by new lenders this would o ften be an impossible task.
Bolton and Skeel, 53 Emory LJ at 763 (cited in note 5).
At first glance, it may appear that the first step vote would invariably lead to a

49 percent haircut

under a simple majority voting rule, since a bare maj ority of creditors would form a coalition to
cut off the remaining creditors, thus increasing the likelihood of repayment for the winning
creditors. But the minimum winning coalition intuition only applies if there are numerous, same
sized classes of creditors. If there were only one large creditor class, for instance, the class would
presumably agree to whatever haircut optimizes its repayment, based on the sovereign debtor's
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approved the haircut, the debtor would submit a restructuring plan outlining the
proposed treatment of each class of creditors for a sec ond, class-by-clas s vote.30
I f the requisite maj ority of each class voted yes, the plan would b e implemented
according to its term s . In the event that one or more classes rejected the plan, on
the other hand, the court would reduce the creditors' claims in the amount o f
the agreed upon haircut, starting with the lowest priority creditors and working
up the p riority hierarchy.
This

two-step

approach

has

several

crucial

virtues.

Perhaps

most

importantly, it would clarify creditors ' priorities outside of bankruptcy and
sharply reduce the risk of debt dilution. Since creditors would know that any
subsequent bankruptcy would be governed by the firs t-in-time priority scheme,
the priorities would apply within and without s overeign bankruptcy. 3 1 For
sovereigns that actually invoked the procedure, the two-step voting structure
would provide a mechanism fo r pushing the parties towards a resolution even if
bargaining broke down, much as the threats of liquidation or cramdown do in
ordinary corporate bankruptcies under US Chapter 1 1 . 3 2
The principal exception to abs olute priority in our sovereign bankruptcy
framework comes with its

second key feature, interim financing. As with

corporate debtors under Chapter

1 1,

our framework would provide first priority

for interim financing in order to counteract the debt overhang problem that
otherwise might discourage lenders from financing the res tructuring proce s s .
Because o f the risk that priority treatment would encourage overbo rrowing,
however, we distinguish between two categories of loan s . Loans to finance the

30

31

32

financial condition. In the real world, the capital structure of a sovereign debror will fall
somewhere between the two extremes of numerous, same-sized classes and a single giant class.
The first stage vote will also be affected by other factors, such as the sovereign debtor's interest in
seeking only as much of a haircut as is necessary, in order to preserve credibility and its access to
sovereign debt markets after the bankruptcy.
Our proposal does not specify the required voting percentage, as the voting rule could be tailored
by each sovereign when the bankruptcy framework was adopted. But we speculate that many
would require a two-thirds supermaj ority, as under US Chapter 1 1 . Bolton and Skeel, 53 Emory L
J at 797 (cited in note 5).
Sovereigns could, of course, still try to game the system and dilute earlier debt by issuing debt
,-vith very short maturities as their finances deteriorated. They would have difficulty finding buyers
for such debt, however, because investors would know that their interests would be wiped out if
the sovereign debtor filed for bankruptcy before repaying the new debt.
Under Bankruptcy Code section 1 11 2(b), creditors can propose that a case be converted to
Chapter 7 in order to liquidate the debtor; and section 1 1 29(b) provides a mechanism for
"cramming" down a reorganization plan despite the objection of one or more classes of credirors.
1 1 USC §§ 1112(b), 1 1 29 (b) (2000) . Although sovereign debtors cannot be liquidated and the
absence of a liquidation option makes cramdowrr clifficult to imptemerrr, [he [wo-tiered voting
regime is designed to achieve a similar effect.
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s overeign's trade debt would be presumptively permissible, 33 whereas s ome form
o f approval, such as from a maj ority of the sovereign's creditors would be
required for larger loans. This strategy would effectively cabin the size o f interim
loans . In addition to minimizing the risk o f overborrowing, the limited interim
financing would also reduce the impact on the IMP's budget if the IMF
continued to serve as interim financer.34
The final is sue is who should oversee the s overeign bankruptcy framework.
Unlike earlier proposals, which would vest authority in a panel of experts set up
by a new or existing international organization, our proposal would permit
sovereign debtors to flie their case in the bankruptcy or insolvency court of any
jurisdiction where the sovereign has is sued bonds (currently, this is likely to
mean N ew York, London, Frankfurt, or Tokyo) . Not only would judges be
better decisionmakers than the experts selected by a bureaucratic process, but
giving s overeigns a choice would promote jurisdictional competition and, as a
result, further enhance the decision-making proce s s . The competition would be
loos ely analogous to the benefits of venue choice for corporate debtors in the
US.

D . A p PRAISIN G ARGENTI N A ' S DEBT
RESTRU C T U RI N G CHAL LEN GES
It took only three months after a final futile attempt by the IMF to rescue
Argentina in September 200 1 followed by a desperate move by the Argentine
government to restructure its domestic debt, for Argentina to face the inevitable
and declare a default on its foreign debt. At the same time, Argentina also ended
its nearly decade long currency board experiment, resulting in a rapid and
subs tantial depreciation of the peso, which precipitated a sys temic bank run. The
nation's new government hastily responded with a general freeze on bank
deposits that lasted for over half a year, with devastating effects on the economy.
The dislocation of the Argentine economy provoked by the default and its
aftershocks was s o great that GDP contracted by 1 1 percent in 2002-with a
predictable sharp increase in poverty and unemployment. Understandably, in the
mid s t of an economic crisis of such magnitude and the associated political
turmoil, external debt restructuring was

not a priority

for the Argentine

government in 2002. Creditors were also reluctant to initiate negotiations at a

33

34

For a description of the contours of trade debt financing, see, for example, IMF, Trade Fillance in
Fin ancial
C,ises:
Assessment
of Key
Issues
(Dec
9,
2003),
available
online
at
<http:/ /\vww.im f.org/ externalinp/pdr/cr/2003/eng/120903.pdf> (visited Feb 7, 2005).
Our earlier article contemplated that the IMF would continue to play this role. See Bolton and
Skeel, 53 Emory L J 763 (cited in note 5). In Part III of this Article, we propose a new strategy for
interim financing that entails a restructuring of the IMP's role.
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time when the economy and Argentina's perceived ability to repay its external
debt were at their lowest.
While Argentina was undergoing the worst economic crisis in its history,
commentators in the SDRM debate sometimes pointed to Argentina as a test
case, which would vindicate advocates of a contractual approach to sovereign
debt restructuring and show that it was possible to orchestrate a voluntary debt
restructuring successfully in a short period of time. Unlike the few prior cases of
successful debt res tructuring such as Pakistan, the U kraine, and Ecuador, the
size

and complexity of Argentina's

external debt res tructuring problem

involving multiple bond issues held by hundreds of thousands of creditors all
over the world and adding up to nearly ninety billion dollars total face

valu e

of

debt-would truly put the contractual approach to the test. Could a voluntary
re structuring of such magnitude and involving so many creditors be completed
successfully in a reasonable amount of time? And could Argentina avoid falling
prey to holdout creditors and to the uncoordinated legal actions of multiple
creditor group s?
Advocates of a contractual approach argued that the ris k of private
litigation and the potentially disruptive consequences of court rulings in the
wake of E lliott Associates

v

Peru were highly exaggerated. They predicted that no

US or English court would grant E lliott-type injunctions to Argentine creditors.
They also maintained that once negotiations started and an offer was on the
table, the contracting parties would be able to reach a swift agreement without
undue delays. The only source of delay, they maintained, was due to the
Argentine government dragging their feet and refusing to initiate negotiations.
Furthermore, a statutory mechanism for debt restructuring, as envisioned by the
IMF, would fare just as poorly in inducing the Argentine government to the
negotiating table.
Their predictions have only partially been borne out by events. The risk of
private

litigation

did

indeed

turn

out

to

be

less

important

than

many

commentators had feared. There have been fewer lawsuits than expected and the
US District Court for the Southern District of New York in particular-where
several actions against Argentina have been brought-has shown considerable
restraint and willingness to first give negotiations a chance. The court has also
ruled in favor of Argentina in limiting creditors' ability to seize Argentine assets
in the US, such as Argentine military as sets and Argentine payments to its
embassy.35 The same court had earlier certified a class action suit by a group of
creditors and granted these creditors the right to attach Argentina's commercial
assets worldwide. Partly in response to this ruling, Argentina had to take several
35

Angela Pruitt,
2004) .

US Judge limits Scope oJDiscovery on Argentine Assets,

1 92

Dow Jones Newswires (May 1 3,
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precautionary steps to protect its assets-such as tran sferring funds to its
embassies

through

channels

outside

the

banking

system,

and

temporarily

renationalizing the postal service to preempt the attachment of postal service
assets abroad. While clearly disrup tive, these steps have not, however, impo sed
substantial costs on Argentina as had been feared.
Predictions of advocates of a laissez faire approach have proved inaccurate,
on the other hand, as to the likely ease and speed of the voluntary res tructuring
approach. Argentina's experience in the three and a half years following the
declaration o f default on its external debt has, if anything, underscored the
difficulties and inefficiencies o f a contractual approach, and provides support for
the more interventionist policy envisioned by the IMF under the SDRM. Indeed,
nearly four years have passed and an incomplete res tructuring agreement has
only just now been secured. These nearly four years of delay are not entirely
attributable to the Argentine government's reluctance to negotiate. A first offer
in September of 2003 to write o ff

75

percent of the nominal value of the debt

had been flatly rejected by creditors as too low, especially in light of the
promising signs of recovery of the economy in the early months of 2003. After
the collapse of this first round of negotiations, creditors did not sit still. Many
small holders of Argentine bonds, mainly based in Europe, organized themselves
under

the

Global

Committee

of

Argentina

B ondholders

("GCAB ")-a

bondholder committee seeking to represent dispersed bondholders in direct
negotiations with the Argentine government.
Although a recent debt- swap offer has been accepted by a roughly

75

percent maj ority of creditors, there have never been formal direct negotiations
between the GCAB or any other representative bondholder committee in the
3
past two years. 6 Indeed, with the strong backing of Argentine public opinion
and

a

strengthening economy,

the

Kirchner government adopted

a hard

negotiating line and refused to make significant concessions on its first offer.
Although Argentina's ability to repay its debts has significantly improved over
the past two years, its willingness to pay has if anything decreased. Most o f
Argentina's costs of default had been incurred i n 2002 and were sunk b y the
time negotiations started. N either the Argentine economy nor the government
was in urgent need of borrowing from international capital markets . With the
GCAB insis ting that Argentina's ability to repay should be the only criterion for
determining the size o f a reasonable haircut, there was little room for a mutual
understanding between the two parties.
Despite the tough stance taken by the Argentine government and its
decision to move forward with a new unilateral, take-it-or-leave-it, debt swap
offer, it still took considerable time to put forward a new proposal. There were
36

Adam Thomson, A"gentina Seeks to Ease Creditor Concerns on Debt Clause, Fin Times 6 Oan 1 5 , 2005).
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initial he sitations as to the form of the offer and the extent to which early
adopters should be favored over later adopters to build in an incentive to accept
the exchange.37 The Argentine government had further difficulty in enlisting an
investment bank to organize the debt exchange.

And

finally,

following a

worldwide road-show to advertise the exchange�. Argentina still had to receive
the app roval of a number of National Financial Regulators in countries like Italy,
where a large number of small Argentine bondholders resided.
The successful completion of the recent swap is

not

due

to

Argentina

coming around to bondholders' demands. Rather, after sticking to its tough
bargaining stance for nearly four years, Argentina has managed to wear down a
large fraction of creditors . Also, Argentina has benefited from a sharp decline in
emerging market debt yields-an unexpected development that has produced a
subs tantial increase in the real value of the debt exchange.
At the time of writing it is not possible to say what will happen to the
holdouts

of the

recent

debt

exchange.

Will their bargaining position

be

strengthened or weakened? Will they prevail in court against attempts by the
Argentine government to stay in default on those bonds? Thus, even after
Argentina's resounding victory in the latest debt exchange, it is still not clear
how successfully the voluntary debt res tructuring proce ss will play out with the
significant fraction of holdouts . Few observers would describ e this experience as
vindication of a laissez faire approach. It is even harder to describe Argentina's
debt restructuring experience as particularly favorable to creditors. Bondholders
could hardly have obtained worse terms had the restructuring taken place under
a more formal bankruptcy procedure such as that proposed by the SDRM. In all
likelihood they would have secured a deal much sooner and under better term s .
In hindsight, the Argentine experience points to one major advantage o f a
statutory approach: it can be structured to keep the negotiating process moving
forward by specifying hard deadlines for o ffers to be submitted, as in Chapter
1 1 , and by structuring incentives for the parties to come to a quick res olution o f
the restructuring process. The Argentine experience also highlights that creditors
can be put in a weaker bargaining position under laissez faire through a coercive
exchange o ffer than they would be under a statutory procedure where final
approval depends on some form of supermajority voting.

37

According to Dow Jones, the Argentine government eventually decided to abandon initial plans
to include "exit consent" clauses in Argentina's debt-swap offer as a way of avoiding potential
future litigation and securing approval of the plan with some countries' financial regulators.
Argentina LaIJagna: Confirms No Debt Swap "Exit Consents ", Dow Jones Newswires (Nov 5, 2004) .
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I I I . T RANSFO R MIN G T H E I M P ' s ROLE AS A LEND ER
OF LAST RESORT

The IMP's place in the international financial architecture is now more
uncertain than it has been since the collapse of the Bretton Woods framework in
the 1 970s. The size of the Fund relative to international financial flows and to
the stock of foreign reserves held by central banks around the world has been
shrinking to the point where it can no longer play a credible leadership role as
lender of last resort for any but the smaller emerging market borrowers. As a
result, the Fund has increasingly been drawn to focus on emerging market
countries and to redefine its mis sion as one of macroassistance to developing
nations and to poverty reduction-a role traditionally performed by the World
Bank. It is not clear whether the Fund has the expertise to fill this new role
effectively, and there is a risk that it may end up being marginalized by the
World Bank and other development aid agencies. But more importantly, the new
mission that has been pressed onto the IMF due to lack of funding is not the
mission that the Fund has been set up to pursue.
One obvious way of restoring the IMP's original role, advocated by some
G-7 countries , is to substantially increase the size of the Fund. But even if this
enlargement were feasible, the history of past interventions would still raise
major concerns about the potential distortions large bailout packages can
introduce into sovereign debt markets. Another way forward, advocated by
several leading economists, is to move in the opposite direction-further scaling
back. the size of the fund, phasing out IMF programs entirely, and confining the
IMF to a purely advisory role.38
We believe that neither of these two options is desirable. If the IMF were
no longer a major source of emergency lending for distressed sovereigns, as
advocates of a scaled back IMF propose, why should sovereign governments pay
any attention to its advice? Even free advice would not be welcome, and the
IMF would be doomed to irrelevance. More importantly, once the IMF exited
the lending business, it could no longer play its role as catalyst to help resolve
liquidity crises and debt panics.39 The alternative solution, a much larger but
unreformed and highly political institution, would give rise to moral hazard in
lending and other distortions. Perpetuating the status quo is equally undesirable,
since it would be equivalent to condemning the institution to a slow death.
3H

See Rogoff,

Tbe Sisters at 60,

Qllestions about tbe
39

Economist at 65 (cited in note 2); Chari and Kehoe, Asking tbe Rigbt
IlvIF, Federal Reserve Bank of J\,iinneapolis Annual Report Issue (cited in note

2) .
See Giancarlo Corsetti, Bernardo Guimaraes, and Nouriel Roubini, Intemational Lending of Last
NBER Working Paper No 1 0 1 25 (Dec
2003), available online at <http: / / papers.nber.org / papers / w 1 0 1 25 .pdf> (visited Mar 20, 2005).

Res0l1 and Moral Hazard: A Mode! ofIMF's Catalytic Finance,
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Rather than any of these alternatives, we believe that the IMP's role should
be reconfigured in a very different way, as part of a sovereign bankruptcy
framework that es tablishes an enforceable priority system for sovereign debt.
The role we envision would strengthen the IMF's ability to act as an ILOLR in
emerging market liquidity and. confidence, crises; It would also strengthen the
IMP's hand in resolving sovereign debt ins olvency crises. Yet it would not
require any new public funding.
The proposal is quite simple. Instead of acting like a central bank that
provides liquidity to a bank facing a bank run, the IMF would function like a
bankruptcy

court

charged

with

granting

first-day

orders

and

other

DIP

financing. In practice, not much change would be required in the way the IMF
operates. A distres sed sovereign would still begin by approaching the Fund with
a request for an assistance package. The size of the loan and its conditionality
would still be negotiated between the Fund and the sovereign behind closed
doors. The loan agreement would still have to be approved by the IMF's Board .
But under the new role we envision, the IMF would put together a funding
package that would include priority lending from the private sector along with its
own funds and any other public funding it can as semble. Over time, the IMF
would need to rely on a greater and greater contribution from the private sector.
To secure this sovereign debt version of DIP financing, the negotiations
inevitably would involve the private sector as well as the IMF, since few private
lenders are anxious to lend on a sight-unseen basis. In practice, the private s ector
involvement would be an important benefit of the new model we envision.
Currently, when a package is put together the private sector does not participate
in the negotiations and ess entially must take the deal the IMF has worked out
with the sovereign as a fait accompli. This process not only makes it more difficult
to involve the private sector, but also encourages free riding by private lenders
on the IMP's emergency lending. Under our proposed new system, private
lenders

would

involvement

be

would

directly
thus

involved

in

automatically

be

the

negotiations;

tied

to

the

private

re scue

sector

deal.

The

coordination between private lenders and the IMP's role as ILOLR is an
important benefit of our framework.
Another important benefit of the new model is that it would gradually shift
from taxpayer to private sector money and would be sub j ect to more and more
market discipline. If the private sector viewed a proposed rescue package as just
more money down the drain, it would in all likelihood refuse to extend new
lending even if the new loans had higher priority
40

status.

40

Similarly, if the

This intuition is buttressed by the experience in Chapter 1 1 cases. The existing empirical evidence
suggests that DIP financers are more likely to lend to debtors that have a significant chance of
successfully reorganizing, than to more precarious firms. See, for example, Maria Carapeto, Does
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sovereign were a repeat offender it would, over time, have less and less access to
emergency lending and would risk being shut out of the international credit
markets.41 The rea son is simply that following each crisis the sovereign would
have accumulated a larger stock of still outstanding priority debt and would be
less and less able to secure new DIP financing, particularly if, as we propose
below, prior DIP loans have priority over any subsequent DIP financing.42
While the new role we envision calls for a radical departure from existing
policy, it would not fundamentally change the process by which the larger crises
are ' currently handled. Consider, for example, how the IMF managed South
Korea's debt crisis in 1 9 97. After a substantial rescue package was put together
on December 3, 1 9 97, it quickly became clear that the funds promised to the
South Korean government would be insufficient. 43 The package had not
adequately reassured markets, and banks continued to pull out of Korean
sovereign debt, refusing to roll over their short-term loans, something they had
never objected to doing in the past. Faced with an impending crisis, the Treasury
and Federal Reserve resolved as a last resort to convene a meeting with the
major lenders under the auspices of the New York Fed on December 22, 1 997,
and managed to wring an informal agreement from those present to continue
rolling over their loans.44 The only way the Treasury and Fed could entice the
banks to attend the meeting, and then to cooperate by agreeing to roll over their
loans, was mora! suasion bolstered by the fear of a maj or financial crisis if banks
refused to follow the IMP's lead. As several commentators have observed, moral
suasion is a rather weak inducement to rely on in dealing with a crisis of these
proportions . It would be foolish to depend on such a policy to maintain

41

42
43

44

Debtor-in·Possession Financing A dd Va/tie? (unpublished manuscript, 2003), available online at
<http:/ h.vww . cass.city.ac.uk / faculty/mcarapeto/papers/DIPFinancing.pdf> (visited Mar 20,
2005) (finding that debtors receiving interim financing more likely to reorganize); Sandeep Dahiya
et aI, Debtor·in-Possession Financing and Bankl7lptcy Resolution: Empin'cal Evidence, 69 J Fin Econ 259
(2003) (same) .

Our approach would not preclude debt reduction initiatives for Highly Indebted Poor Countries
("HIPCs"). These initiatives '-v ould merely take a di fferent form. Instead of forgiving previously
granted official multilateral debt, the international community would buy private debt in the
secondary market and then retire it.
See text accompanying note 49.
A total of fifty.five billion dollars, of which twenty·one billion dollars was contributed by the
IMF, was promised the South Korean government. This represented the highest amount the IMF
had ever lent to a single country and exceeded the normal quota by a multiple of six. See Blustein,
The Chastening at 1 48 (cited in note 1 ) .
Six U S banks-Citibank, J . P . Morgan, Chase, Bank of A m erica Bankers Trust, and Bank o f New
York-attended the first New York meeting, which kick·started a series of negotiations with
international banks that eventually led to a rescheduling agreement of twenty·two billion dollars in
short-term loans in exchange for a sovereign bond, with the Korean government on January 28,
1 998. Id at 1 77-205.
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international financial stability. It is not difficult to imagine a different outcome
to the Korean crisis, with some major banks deciding not to attend the meeting
at the New York Fed for example, and others unwilling to go along with the
IMF or unable to agree on how the cost of rolling over their debts should be
shared.
Now imagine the same situation, but with the IMF wielding new powers to
grant priority status to banks' new emergency lending. In contrast to the
situation at the time, under this new regime banks would have had an incentive
to attend the meeting, since this might have given them an opportunity to obtain
higher priority status for their new loans. The higher priority would have put
them in a stronger position than the banks that did not attend the meeting if the
rescue plan failed and Korea defaulted on its existing debts . In addition, for
those banks attending the meeting, the IMF would have been able to secure
their cooperation much more easily by granting seniority status to their new
loans.45
While the potentially huge benefits of this new role for the IMP are
obvious, there also are several potential concerns. A first issue is whether a
highly politicized institution like today's IMF would abuse its new powers and
grant priority lending too liberally. This was a constant worry in the early days of
Chapter 1 1 , with courts permitting debtors to drag out cases for years, and
generally deviating too easily from enforcement of absolute priority. 46 The
history of IMF bailouts suggests that similar problems could undermine the
framework we have des cribed unless the ability to grant priority status to
emergency lending was constrained. One such constraint might be to require
creditor approval of DIP loans, if the loans are beyond a certain size or involve a
high proportion of new lenders.47
There is a delicate balancing here, however, as any approval required by
creditors before the DIP financing is granted could undermine the IMP's ability
to respond quickly and quietly to a crisis . Announcing to all creditors that a
sovereign is seeking their approval for new DIP financing is tantamount to

45

46

47

Although the size of the bank loans would often be quite large, there is no reason to suspect that
this would jeopardize the financing process we propose. In ordinary corporate bankruptcy cases,
bankruptcy courts have overseen major loans-such as the $.1.5 billion DIP loan to United
Airlines-without a hitch.
See for example Lynn M. LoPucki, The Trouble with Chapter 1 1, 1 993 Wise L Rev 729
(documenting the increased length of Chapter 1 1 cases).
The possibility of a creditor vote on financing in the corporate context is considered and critiqued
in George G. Triantis, A Theory ifthe Regulation ifDebtor-in-Possessiol1 Financing, 46 Vand L Rev 901,
9 1 5-16 (1 993). Our previous article proposed that financing in amounts sufficient to cover a
sovereign's trade debt should presumptively be approved, without a creditor vote. Bolton and
Skeel, 53 Emory L J at 808 (cited in note 5).
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broadcasting the sovereign's financial distress to the world and may well do
more harm than good. Therefore, unless the sovereign was already in default and
had suspended debt payments, and short of reforming the governance of the
IMF, a more practical protection would be to either put ex ante limits on the
size of DIP financing (such as a maximum percentage of outstanding debt) or to
allow for the possibility that courts could reverse the priority status of the most
egregious forms of DIP financing ex post if the sovereign subsequently invoked
the bankruptcy procedures once again. This latter pos sibility would ins till some
market discipline on the DIP lenders and limit the worst forms of abuse of DIP
financing-although at the cost of introducing additional uncertainty into the
lending markets.48
A second concern is whether a priority rule for sovereign debt could be
enforced at all. How would the IMF be able to enforce priority? How should a
recalcitrant sovereign be dealt with? So far the IMF has on the whole been able
to enforce the higher priority of -its own funds . 49 The IMP's success can be
traced to

a

maj or carrot and stick it can apply to enforce its priority status.

Compliant sovereigns continue to have access to IMF program s at favorable
rates, whereas a recalcitrant sovereign risks losing its membership and facing
some form of exclusion fro m sovereign debt markets. There is no reason a
priori to expect that the IMP's enforcement powers would disappear if the loan
were made by the private sector with the IMF's bles sing. But, should the stock
of senior debt become so large that the sovereign might be tempted to default
and to ignore the priority status in a restructuring, one could still enVlSlon
enforcement of priority through the courts via Elliott- style remedies.
Third, what happens when a sovereign repeatedly runs into financial
distress and accumulates s enior loans from past DIP financing? Wouldn't new
DIP financing risk diluting old DIP loans, if the sovereign debtor defaulted a
second or even third time on all its debt? And if this dilution were anticipated
wouldn't it prevent the IMF from obtaining emergency lending from the private
sector? An obvious way of addres sing these problems would be to make sure
that past DIP loans had priority over current and future DIP loans. In e ffect, the
first priority DIP loans would themselves be subject to a first-in-time priority
regtme.
Fourth, how would Paris Club and other bilateral government debt be
treated? Ideally, Paris Club creditors would be subj ect to the same res tructuring
process as other creditors . It is unlikely, however, that sovereign lenders would

48

Under US bankruptcy law, a court's initial decision on

DIP financing generally cannot be reversed

so long as the credit was extended in good faith-a protection that is justified as necessary to
49

ensure certainty. See 1 1 USC § 364(e).
See Zettelmeyer, The Casefor all Explicit Seniority Structure in Sovereign Debt (cited in note 1 8) .
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agree

to put themselves under the

authority of the

IMF or a

sovereign

bankruptcy regime . The most plausible approach for handling Paris Club debt
would be to treat it as a priority obligation. Although this poses the risk that
Paris Club loans will dilute the interests of private creditors, one benefit is the
pos sibility that an alternative source of emergency lending to sovereigns would
be available that could serve the role of a safety valve in cases where the IMF
failed to intervene, perhaps for political reasons .
The final issue is implementation: What changes would need to be made to
res tructure the IMP's role as we have described? Advocates
bankruptcy

have

proposed

a

variety

of

implementation

of sovereign

strategies.

One

commentator suggests that sovereigns could unilaterally adopt a sovereign
bankruptcy regime. 50 Under this approach, a model law could be drafted by
UN CITRAL or another international organization,

and

the

legislature s

of

sovereign debtor states could pass legislation based on the draft law. In effect,
the bankruptcy framework would set the parameters of the debtor's obligations
to its creditors. A second strategy would rely on treaties among the creditor and
debtor nations or a convention ratified by the legislatures of the various affected
countries. Still another strategy centers on an amendment of the IMP's articles,
which would require majority approval by the IMF and approval of three-fifths
of the Fund's members .51 Members would then be expected to take appropriate
steps to implement the change under their domestic law. This third approach is
the strategy the IMF planned to use to implement its SDRM .52
We believe that the new role we envision for the IMF would not by itself
require arry of these changes . Since our proposal would simply reconfigure the
IMF's exis ting role-retaining IMF oversight while privatizing the lending
function-it should not require the IMF to go back to its members to ask for
different or additional authority. This suggests that the IMF could adop t the
reconfigured role on an ad hoc basis, by negotiating a flllancing package that
relies on private lending the next time it intervenes in a sovereign debt crisis. In
our view, the ease with which the proposal could be adopted is one of its signal
attractions.

so

51

52

Christoph G. Paulus, A Legal Orderfor Insolvencies of States 6-7 (unpublished manuscript), available
online at <http:// www.inwent.org/ef-texte/sdrm/paulus.htm> (visited Mar 20, 2005).
More precisely, amendment of the IMF Articles requires three steps: (1) the Executive Board
votes on a proposed amendment, and it is approved by a majority of rhose who vote; (2) the
amendment is approved by a majority of rhe Board of Governors who vote; and (3) it is approved
by three-fifths of the members of the Fund, with at least 85 percent of the total voting authority.
See for example IMF, The Design of the Sovereign Debt Restructun'ng Mechanism-Further Considerations
at '\) 275-82 (cited in note 1 1) (describing the amendment proces-s}
Id.
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Adjusting the IMF's role by itself, however, is an incomplete solution to
the

shortcomings

in

the

existing international

financial architecture;

most

importantly, it would not addre ss the need for a coherent, enforceable priority
scheme-a need that we have stre ssed throughout the Article. But even in the
ab sence

of a more

complete

reform

such

as

sovereign

bankruptcy,

the

reconfigured IMF role o ffers two hugely important benefits: it would addre ss
the IMF's funding limitations and would bring the private sector into the heart
of the debt restructuring process. More generally, the recon figured role would
preserve the IMF's relevance for the sovereign debt markets of the new century.
These bene fits suggest that it would make sense to adopt the new approach
now, without waiting for more sweeping reforms such as implementation of a
sovereign bankruptcy regime.
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